Swapping something real by Glick, David
Abstract
Experiments demonstrating entanglement swapping have been alleged to
challenge realism about entanglement. Seevinck (2006) claims that entangle-
ment “cannot be considered ontologically robust” while Healey (2012) claims
that entanglement swapping “undermines the idea that ascribing an entangled
state to quantum systems is a way of representing some new, non-classical,
physical relation between them.” My aim in this paper is to show that realism
is not threatened by the possibility of entanglement swapping, but rather, it
should be informed by the phenomenon. I argue—expanding the argument
of Timpson and Brown (2010)—that ordinary entanglement swapping cases
present no new challenges for the realist. With respect to the delayed-choice
variant discussed by Healey, I claim that there are two options available to the
realist: (a) deny these are cases of genuine swapping (following Egg (2013))
or (b) allow for existence of entanglement between timelike separated regions.
This latter option, while radical, is not incoherent and has been suggested in
quite different contexts. While I stop short of claiming that the realist must
take this option, doing so allows one to avoid certain costs associated with
Egg’s “orthodox” account. I conclude by noting several important implication




The phenomenon of quantum entanglement has been taken to have broad
metaphysical implications.1 Such implications presuppose a broadly realist
view of entanglement, one that recognizes a genuine physical relation between
the subsystems that compose an entangled system. This entanglement relation,
in turn, is used to explain the sorts of non-local correlations found in the
measurement results of EPR-B2 and related experiments. These correlations
are “non-local” in that they hold between distant measurement events that
occur at the same time—i.e., at spacelike separation.
Recent experiments involving “entanglement swapping,” threaten to com-
plicate our typical understanding of entanglement. Some have even suggested
that these experiments threaten to undermine the realist position altogether.
Below I will argue that this isn’t the case. However, entanglement swapping
is not without important implications for the realist. Indeed, I claim that
delayed-choice entanglement swapping gives us reason to consider extending
1Ladyman and Ross claim that “entanglement as described by QM teaches us that Humean
supervenience is false, and that all the properties of fundamental physics seem to be extrinsic
to individual objects” (2007, 151). A similar claim is made by Esfeld (2004), who claims that
entanglement recommends a “metaphysics of relations.” Quantum entanglement also pays a critical
role in Schaffer’s (2010) defense of monism, the view that there is ultimately only one object: the
entire universe.
2I use “EPR-B” to refer to variations of the experimental arrangement due to Einstein et al.
(1935) and extended by Bohm (1951). The variations most relevant in what follows will be those
involving photon pairs with entangled polarizations.
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entanglement into the temporal dimension. By allowing for timelike entangle-
ment, the realist is able provide a unified account of a variety of experimental
results. Even if one rejects this radical suggestion, ordinary cases of entangle-
ment swapping alone require revising widely-held views about the nature of
entanglement.
2 Preliminaries
Quantum theory doesn’t wear its metaphysics on its sleeve. Different inter-
pretations of quantum theory radically diverge on what (if anything) it tells
us about the world. Accordingly, it is impossible to undertake our investi-
gation without making some interpretative assumptions. That said, many of
the issues here cross-cut interpretations and I hope to remain as neutral as
possible between the various realist interpretations. I begin with the orthodox
view of how entanglement arises in the formalism of (ordinary, non-relativistic)
quantum mechanics.
2.1 Nonseperable quantum states
Quantum mechanics allows for nonseparable quantum states. To keep matters
as simple as possible, consider two particles, 1 and 2, each of which can be as-
signed a pure quantum state. The standard approach represents the quantum
state of each particle with a vector (ray) |ψ〉 in a Hilbert space H. The quan-
tum states of two systems 1,2, then, correspond to vectors |ψ〉, |φ〉 in Hilbert
spaces H1,H2, respectively. The joint state of the system they compose is rep-
resented by the vector |Ψ〉 in the tensor product Hilbert space H12 = H1⊗H2.
If the state vector |Ψ〉 in H12 can be expressed as a product of vectors |ψ〉, |φ〉
in Hilbert spaces H1,H2, then |Ψ〉 is separable. But, in general, a vector in H12
cannot be expressed in the form |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉, with |ψ〉 ∈ H1 and |φ〉 ∈ H2.
Such states are called nonseparable quantum states.
On the standard view, entanglement occurs when distinct physical systems
are attributed nonseparable quantum states. Thus, if two photons 1,2 are
prepared in the nonseperable joint polarization state |Ψ−〉 = 1√2(|HV 〉−|V H〉),
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they (or their quantum states) are mutually entangled. While this standard
view of entanglement has been criticized (Ghirardi et al. 2002; Ladyman et al.
2013), all of the cases considered below will count as entangled on any suitable
definition. Accordingly, I will bracket worries about the precise formulation
of entanglement in the quantum formalism and simply assume the standard
account for ease of exposition.
2.2 Entanglement realism
In order to say more about entangled systems, we must go beyond the formal-
ism of quantum theory. What is the significance of ascribing entangled states
to a set of physical systems?
In what follows, I will be concerned with views that accord the quantum
state a descriptive role. Thus, when we attribute entangled states to compos-
ite systems, that tells us something about the relation between the physical
subsystems in question. I will aim to remain as neutral as possible about the
nature of this relation. The following are two possible views about the nature
of this relation:
Action at a Distance: On this view, distant entangled subsystems are ca-
pable of having an immediate and unmediated causal influence on each
other.
Ontological Holism: On this view, a compound entangled system is viewed
as a nonseparable whole, which is irreducible to the subsystems it com-
prises.
Other variations of these views are possible as well. Some maintain that
entangled systems are connected by a new non-supervenient relation while
others speak of non-local influence that fails to be genuinely causal. It is not my
aim here to adopt any particular approach to the metaphysics of entanglement.
Rather, what will be at issue is the following thesis:
Entanglement Realism: Entangled systems bear a genuine physical rela-
tion to one another—one that is constitutive of their mutual entangle-
ment.
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Entanglement realism cross-cuts interpretations of quantum theory. Broadly
“anti-realist” interpretations such as instrumentalism and other epistemic views
will deny the thesis, but so will some characteristically “realist” views as well.
First, consider an instrumentalist that views the quantum state epistemically.
On this view, the assignment of a non-separable quantum state is a way of
summarizing our information about the system. While ascribing such a quan-
tum state allows us to predict non-local correlations, this view stops short of
recognizing a physical entanglement relation between the particles themselves
(if there are such things). Second, consider a Bohmian who takes the motion
of particles to be fundamental and understands the wavefunction as a law-like
feature of how particles move. On such a view, an entangled quantum state
does not support the existence of a new physical relation between particles,
but only describes/guides the motion of the particles so as to generate non-
local correlations. There is not space to discuss all possible interpretations
of quantum theory and their relation to entanglement realism, nor is this the
appropriate place to debate the merits of the view. Instead, I’ll conclude this
section with two remarks intended to clarify the position.
First, whether an interpretation endorses entanglement realism depends
solely on whether there is a physical relation R that can be attributed to
a compound physical system in virtue of it being ascribed a nonseparable
quantum state; being a “realist” interpretation isn’t sufficient (though it may
be necessary). Second, as with other forms of realism, the primary motivation
for entanglement realism is explanatory. However the entanglement relation is
understood, it should enable robust explanations of non-local correlations in
measurement results. Relatedly, views the deny entanglement realism do so at
the potential cost of being unable to adequately explain non-local correlations.
Thus, there is at least some reason (ceteris paribus) to prefer interpretations
of quantum theory that countenance entanglement realism.
3 Entanglement swapping
The experiments that motivate entanglement across time make use of the
technique of entanglement swapping. Entanglement swapping is a relatively
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recent phenomena, and as a result has received relatively little consideration
by philosophers. A simple experimental arrangement is depicted below (fig-
ure 1). Consider two sources that each produce a pair of photons in the state
|ψ−〉 = 1√2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉). One source produces the entangled pair (1,2) and
the other produces (3,4). Initially, the quantum state of the four-particle sys-
tem is simply the product of two pair states |Ψ〉 = |ψ−〉12⊗|ψ−〉34. This state
is separable into the states |ψ−〉12 and |ψ−〉34, each of which is an entangled
two-photon state. Accordingly, entanglement realist would initially recognize
two distinct entanglement relations—R12 and R34—but no such relations be-
tween the pairs or between photons from different pairs.
Figure 1: Entanglement Swapping Configuration
The outermost particles are sent off to polarization detectors at Alice and
Bob. The inner particles are sent to a common location, Victor, which contains
a switchable Bell-state analyzer. When switched on, a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) is performed, which has the effect of projecting the indent particles into
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one of the four entangled Bell-states.3 Otherwise, a separate state measure-
ment (SSM) is performed. If the analyzer is off and the particles are measured
separately, then, as expected, correlations are found between (1,2)and (3,4) as
in an ordinary EPR-B experiment.
If the analyzer is on, however, particles 2 and 3 are projected into one of
the entangled Bell-states and, as a result, the remaining particles 1 and 4 are
projected into an entangled Bell-state as well. This can be seen by writing the
initial four-particle state in the basis given by the Bell-states of (1,4):
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[|ψ+〉14|ψ+〉23 − |ψ−〉14|ψ−〉23 − |φ+〉14|φ+〉23 − |φ−〉14|φ−〉23]. (1)
Given this expression of |Ψ〉, we can see that if a BSM is performed at
Victor with the result |ψ+〉23, then the remaining particles are projected into
the state |ψ+〉14, and similarly for the other Bell states. Crucially, regardless
of the outcome of the BSM at Victor, photons 1 and 4 become entangled as a
result. This is the case despite the fact that they have never interacted.
At least some have taken this case to problematize entanglement realism:
that one cannot think of entanglement as a property [which] has
some ontological robustness can already be seen using the follow-
ing weaker requirement: anything which is ontologically robust can,
without interaction, not be mixed away, nor swapped to another
object, nor flowed irretrievably away into some environment. Pre-
cisely these features are possible in the case of entanglement and
thus even the weaker requirement for ontological robustness does
not hold. (Seevinck 2006, 1582)
The intuition underlying this challenge is that something real would re-
quire a genuine “interaction” to be altered, but entanglement swapping allows
us to move the entanglement around without such an interaction. But is it
3For polarization measured along the H/V axis these are:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉|V 〉 ± |V 〉|H〉], |φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉|H〉 ± |V 〉|V 〉].
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really the case that there is no interaction responsible for the swapping? After
all, particles 2 and 3 are directly affected by the BSM performed at Victor.
However, nothing is done directly to the remaining particles 1 and 4, and it is
these that become entangled, so perhaps there is something amiss. Indeed, it is
puzzling how exactly 1 and 4 become entangled remotely and instantaneously,
but this is simply the original problem of entanglement in another form.
According to the realist who posits non-local influence, the ordinary EPR
case is already one in which the measurement of a spacelike separated sys-
tem affects the properties of a system entangled with it. If, however, we have
some way of understanding such influence in terms of a physical entanglement
relation, then presumably that relation can do the necessary work needed to
account for entanglement swapping. In the case of a SSM at Victor, measure-
ments of 1 and 4 will display correlations with the results obtained at Victor.
In the case of a BSM, there are not simple correlations between the measure-
ment at Victor and those at Alice and Bob, but rather, a more complex pattern
of relations best accounted for by attributing an entangled Bell-state to the
joint (1,4) system.
Timpson and Brown (2010) agree that entanglement swapping fails to pro-
vide a convincing case against entanglement realism. They suggest an analogy
with gravity in Newtonian physics to illustrate:
We do not think that the relative distance between two planets in
Newtonian physics is not a genuine feature of reality because of the
action-at-a-distance of the gravitational interaction. (Timpson and
Brown 2010, 317)
I take the suggestion to be the following. Just as the Newtonian might seek
to explain a pattern in the motion of two planets by appeal to a pattern in
the motion of two other planets connected to them by an instantaneous grav-
itational influence, entanglement relations could provide a similar connection
between the pairs of particles between which entanglement is swapped. Note,
however, that adopting such a view requires a somewhat broader understand-
ing of action at a distance than is ordinary supposed. Standard formulations
focus on the intrinsic properties of systems. For instance, in his Stanford
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Encyclopedia article on the topic, Berkovitz defines action at a distance as:
a phenomenon in which a change in intrinsic properties of one sys-
tem induces a change in the intrinsic properties of a distant system
without there being a process that carries this influence contigu-
ously in space and time. (Berkovitz 2016).4
To account for entanglement swapping in the manner above, the proponent
of action at a distance must allow that the relational properties of particles
(i.e., their entanglement relations) can influence the relational properties of
the particles with which they are entangled.
How significant of a revision is this? One could claim, along holist lines,
that entanglement is an intrinsic property of the compound system, in which
case the ordinary version of action at a distance perhaps could be preserved. At
least on the “orthodox” understanding of quantum mechanics, however, there
is no clear basis for attributing an intrinsic property to a bipartite system on
the basis of entanglement between its constituents. The extension from intrin-
sic properties to relations is certainly in keeping with the spirit of action at a
distance, as the analogy with Newtonian gravity suggests, but it is a significant
change none the less. Entanglement must now be understood as capable of
spreading new entanglement relations, which is no doubt an interesting result.
Similar revisions are required for the holist to account for entanglement
swapping. When the photons are created there are two pairs of mutually
entangled particles. Hence, the holist would recognize (fundamentally) two
two-photon wholes, (1,2) and (3,4), that are spreading out spatially with time.
Victor’s measurement is performed on both wholes and immediately alters
both. If a SSM is performed, each two-photon system dissolves leaving photons
1 and 4 to be detected later. If a BSM is performed, again each two-photon
system is changed, but in a way that the new wholes (2,3) and (1,4) are
formed. Thus, the holist must allow that certain measurements are capable of
generating new wholes out the parts of the original ones. Again this is does
seem to mark an important revision in the view, but not one that creates any




Before moving to the next section, it is worth noting that entanglement
swapping is not a mere philosophical curiosity, but is part of an active research
program in physics with numerous practical applications, including: construct-
ing a quantum telephone exchange, speeding up the distribution of entangle-
ment, correcting errors in Bell states, preparing entangled states of a higher
number of particles, and secret sharing of classical information (Bouwmeester
et al. 2000). This makes its dismissal or reinterpretation difficult to motivate
from a realist perspective. A key tenant in realist thinking recommends endors-
ing those parts of scientific theory that facilitate predictive and technological
successes such as these.
4 Delayed-choice entanglement swapping
The revision to our understanding of entanglement required by entanglement
swapping cases like that depicted in figure 1 is consistent with the central ideas
of action at a distance or ontological holism. Entanglement swapping with
delayed-choice, by contrast, threatens to undermine such notions completely.
The delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment reinforces
the lesson that quantum states are neither descriptions nor rep-
resentations of physical reality. In particular, it undermines the
idea that ascribing an entangled state to quantum systems is a way
of representing some new, non-classical, physical relation between
them. (Healey 2012, 31)
The idea of delayed-choice entanglement swapping was first proposed by
Peres (2000). We begin with two entangled systems as in the ordinary case,
but rather than have Victor preform his measurement prior to Alice and Bob,
we delay particles 2 and 3 so that Victor can perform his measurement after
his colleagues. Because the explanation of the collapse of equation 1 into
entangled Bell-states of (2,3) and (1,4) didn’t specify any times, quantum
mechanics suggests that the same results would obtain. In particular, when
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Victor successfully performs a BSM, entanglement will be swapped to 1 and
4.
And, in fact, these results seem to have been confirmed by an experiment
conducted by Ma et al. (2012) depicted below (Figure 2). We begin as be-
fore: two pairs of entangled photons (1,2) and (3,4) are produced by two EPR
sources in the state |ψ−〉12 ⊗ |ψ−〉34. At this point the photons 1 and 2 are
mutually entangled, as are 3 and 4, but the 4-particle state is separable, and
hence there is no entanglement across the two pairs. Alice and Bob each per-
form a polarization measurement of their photon (1 and 4, respectively) along
one of three freely-chosen axes (|H〉/|V 〉, |R〉/|L〉, |+〉/|−〉) and the data from
these measurements are saved for later analysis. Particles 2 and 3, meanwhile,
enter an optical delay, and only reach Victor at time MV , nearly 500ns after
MA and MB, the times at which Alice and Bob perform their measurements.
As before, Victor “chooses” between performing a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) or separate state measurement (SSM) on (2,3). In the actual exper-
iment, the switchable Bell-state analyzer was linked to a quantum random
number generator which determined the measurement (BSM or SSM) to be
performed. The photons 2 and 3 are projected into either an entangled state
(|φ+〉23 or |φ−〉23) if BSM is performed or a separable state in the case of SSM.
When Victor’s results are compared with those of Alice and Bob, they are
found to be consistent with ascribing an entangled state to photons 1 and 4
(|φ+〉14 or |φ−〉14) when BSM is performed and a separable state otherwise.
Thus, it seems that entanglement has been swapped to particles (1,4) after
they have already been detected (at MV )!
This is puzzling to the entanglement realist. It seems that Victor’s later
measurement has an effect on the earlier state of particles 1 and 4. This is
would seem to saddle the realist with a commitment to backward causation,
which many would find beyond the pale. Indeed, the authors themselves seem
to take the experiment to show the inadequacy of the realist approach.
If one views the quantum state as a real physical object, one could
get the seemingly paradoxical situation that future actions appear
as having an influence on past and already irrevocably recorded
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Figure 2: Delayed-choice entanglement swapping arrangement of Ma et al. (2012)
events. However, there is never a paradox if the quantum state is
viewed as to be no more than a “catalogue of our knowledge.” (Ma
et al. 2012, 483)
The committed realist must either deny that entanglement can be swapped
from (2,3) to (1,4) in this case, or else provide some account of how it can
occur. If one seeks to give the same explanation as in the case of entanglement
swapping without delayed-choice, then they must allow that entanglement can
obtain between (1,2) and (3,4) at the time of Victor’s measurement. Of course,
1 and 4 do not exist at the time of Victor’s measurement, so the entanglement
relation must obtain between events at different times. We will return to this
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idea below, but first, it’s worth considering a way the realist may avoid this
consequence.
4.1 Avoidance maneuvers
Matthias Egg (2013) offers a reply on behalf of the entanglement realist. He
urges that to describe the foregoing as a genuine case of entanglement swapping
is to beg the question against the realist. According to Egg’s realist, the parti-
cles (1,4) are either entangled or not at the time of their detection (MA,MB),
and later measurements cannot change this fact. In the case of entanglement
swapping without delayed-choice, entanglement has been “swapped” to (1,4)
as their quantum state has changed to become non-separable as a result of the
measurement taken at Victor. Yet, according to Egg, the quantum state of
(1,4) was separable when measured (MA,MB) in Ma’s experiment and hence
there was never a physical entanglement relation between (1,4) regardless of
which later measurement Victor performs on (2,3).
So what should we make of the experimental evidence in favor of entangle-
ment swapping to (1,4) after their detection?
The Bell measurement on the [2,3] pair allows us to sort the [1,4]
pairs into four subensembles corresponding to the four Bell states.
Without delayed choice, this has physical significance, because each
[1,4] pair really is in such a state after the [2,3] measurement. But
if the [1,4] measurements precede the [2,3] measurement, the [1,4]
pair never is in any of these states. This is entirely compatible with
the fact that evaluating the [1,4] measurements within a certain
subensemble shows Bell-type correlations. (Egg 2013, 1133)
Egg’s reply focuses on an aspect of Ma’s experiment that was omitted from
the initial presentation. Unlike a simple EPR-B experiment, the correlations in
the data recorded by Alice and Bob are only apparent once that data has been
sorted into subsets (“subsenembles”) according to the measurement performed
and results obtained by Victor. Once we sort the results obtained by Alice
and Bob in this way, we find that the subsets of data associated with Victor
performing a BSM exhibit correlations indicative of entanglement.
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Egg’s point is that these correlations only appear once we sort the results
in this manner, and such sorting needn’t have any physical significance. It’s
unsurprising that correlations of some kind can be found when we conditional-
ize on the results obtained by Victor; after all, the photons measured by Victor
were entangled with photons 1 and 4 until the latter were detected. Only when
Victor’s measurement actually causes a change in particles 1 and 4 are we jus-
tified in taking this process of sorting to have physical significance. Here we, as
realists, should not allow that Victor’s measurement has an effect on particles
1 and 4—doing so would require us to countenance backward causation—and
hence the correlations obtained after sorting should not be taken to provide
evidence for a genuine entanglement relation between particles 1 and 4.
4.1.1 Conflict with special relativity
Egg’s reply requires that the entanglement realist make an important distinc-
tion between cases in which Victor’s measurement occurs before Alice and
Bob’s measurements and those in which the time-order is reversed. Only the
former, says Egg, are cases in which (1,4) are genuinely entangled. Yet, spe-
cial relativity teaches that time-order is not an objective, frame-independent
notion. If, for example, Victor’s measurement (MV ) were spacelike separated
from Alice and Bob’s (MA,MB), then there would be no (frame-independent)
fact of the matter about the time-order of the events. This scenario is not a
mere hypothetical possibility either. In the much-publicized recent experiment
of Hensen et al. (2015), entangled photon pairs are created via entanglement
swapping from a location C that is spacelike separated from the measurement
locations A and B (see Hensen et al. 2015, fig. 1e and 2a). Given such cases
exist, adopting Egg’s response would commit the realist to the claim that there
is no (frame-independent) fact of the matter about whether the entanglement
relation obtains. This would saddle the realist with a problematic sort of
metaphysical indeterminacy.
In a footnote earlier in the paper, Egg offers the following rejoinder:
Some of the most widely discussed realistic versions of quantum
theory (e.g., Bohmian mechanics and the matter-density version of
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GRW) involve a commitment to a preferred foliation of spacetime. If
these proposals are reasonable, then so is the assumption that there
is a definite (although undetectable) temporal ordering between any
two events. (2013, 1130, n.7)
It is of course true that a preferred foliation of space-time would solve
the problem, and, indeed, this has been invoked in the service of some in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics, but no such foliation (or a determinate
time-ordering of spacelike separated events) is provided by our best theory of
spacetime.5 In order to take this option, the entanglement realist would be
forced to claim that special relativity must be amended or at least, supple-
mented. This is a significant cost.
4.1.2 Parity of reasoning
Even if we ignore the conflict with relativity, there is a further worry with
Egg’s proposal.
The realist who would deny the reality of entanglement between (1,4) in the
delayed-choice setup must claim that the standard argument for entanglement
realism fails in this case purely because doing so leads to the undesirable
result of backward causation. The argument for attributing entanglement in
the ordinary swapping case relies only on the four-photon state (1) and the
result obtained by Victor, without any mention of time. That same argument
applied to the delayed-choice case delivers the same result, namely, that 1 and
4 are entangled. This result is confirmed by analyzing the data obtained by
Victor, Alice, and Bob. Thus, there seems to be a tension in entanglement
realism (so construed): on the one hand, it recommends recognizing a physical
entanglement relation when it is instrumentally successful to do so, but, on the
other hand, we should not posit such a relation in this case despite meeting the
very same conditions that typically merit such an attribution. The failure to
5Of course, general relativity is our best theory of spacetime, and the situation there is more
complicated. There are several candidates for a preferred foliation in general relativity, such as
the “cosmological time” of relativistic cosmology. However, it is far from clear that any of these
candidates should be taken to provide the metaphysically privileged way of carving up spacetime.
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recognize entanglement in this case is an ad hoc measure to avoid the perceived
alternatives of antirealism or backwards causation.6
5 Entanglement across time
If we reject Egg’s attempt to reinterpret the outcome of these experiments,
we are forced to consider whether the entanglement realism is consistent with
genuine delayed-choice entanglement swapping. In particular, can the account
of ordinary entanglement swapping be extended to cover the delayed-choice
case? Because swapping is facilitated by entanglement relations, the answer
to this question will depend on one’s preferred metaphysics of entanglement.
Suppose we adopt the action at a distance view. This would seem to saddle
the realist with backward causal influence form Victor’s measurement of (2,3)
to particles 1 and 4 prior to their measurements by Alice and Bob.
But not so fast! First, we might question whether the influence is really
backward in time. It is tempting to assume that Victor’s measurement must
bring about the earlier entanglement of 1 and 4, but the dependence between
these events has a certain symmetry. Just as in the ordinary EPR-B case, it’s
hard to know which direction we should take the causal influence to go. Per-
haps we should regard the earlier entanglement of (1,4) to cause the later BSM
of (2,3). This might create worries about Victor’s free will (or the randomness
of the quantum random number generator), but these may not be decisive (see
Evans et al. 2012, §7.1). Second, we might wonder whether entanglement-
mediate influence should be understood as causal. It differs from paradigm
instances of causation in many respects, including: (a) it fails to diminish with
distance; (b) it cannot be shielded; (c) it doesn’t involve a transfer of energy
and; (d) it cannot be used to send signals. The last two conditions are of spe-
cial importance as most paradoxes associated with backward causation seem
to require them. In addition to these differences, action at distance must allow
6The sort of “instrumental success” I have in mind here is primarily the successful prediction
of correlations in measurement results. We may also recall that in cases of entanglement swapping
without delayed-choice, the attribution of an entangled state has important applications in quantum
information theory. It is not unreasonable to suppose that related applications might be found for
the attribution of an entangled state in the delayed-choice case as well.
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for instantaneous influence to account for standard EPR-B experiments and,
as a result, requires the rejection of the ordinary temporal asymmetry of cause
and effect.
So, the action at a distance view can be extended to the timelike case with-
out being committed to “backwards causation” by denying that either of the
terms apply. Alternatively, one may countenance limited backward causation,
but seek to downplay its significance for the reasons above (especially, the
inability to use it for signaling).
Adapting the holist approach to allow for timelike entanglement is less
straightforward. Part of the difficulty is due to the lack of clarity in the view
generally. Many philosophers have advocated understanding entanglement in
terms of a non-supervenient relation (e.g., Teller 1986; Howard 1985, 1989;
Esfeld 2004); the entangled state of the joint system merits the attribution of
a relation between its subsystems that fails to supervene on their individual
intrinsic properties. This is sometimes paired with a claim that the compound
system is more real or fundamental than the subsystems it comprises. One
version may regard the joint system as a single object spread, smeared, or
scattered across space. Another might take the distinct locations inhabited by
the object to be unified in a more fundamental space of higher dimensionality.
The former case, in which joint systems are thought of as wholes scat-
tered in space, seems to allow for extension to timelike separation without
major problems. Temporally-scattered objects are not hard to imagine—a
play with an intermission exists in two discontinuous timelike separated re-
gions of spacetime—but, it’s not obvious how such an approach is capable
(on its own) of accounting for Bell-type non-local correlations. Indeed, Hen-
son (2013) shows that the non-locality resulting from Bell’s theorem is not
avoided by denying separability. In some ways, this result is unsurprising.
Merely redescribing the two photons in an EPR-B scenario as parts of a non-
separable 2-photon whole does little to explain the correlations revealed by
their measurement. This is not to say such an approach is hopeless, but it’s
unclear how it avoids the necessity of non-local influence.7
7It’s possible that the advocate of this version of holism may wish to endorse action at a distance
as well. Perhaps the reason why non-local influence is possible is that entangled systems form a
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The other version of holism, in which joint systems are located at a single
location in some higher-dimensional reality, promises to offer a more satisfying
account of Bell-type correlations. The rough idea is to grant that the world
is non-local in four-dimensional spacetime, but regard this as a reflection of a
more fundamental space of higher-dimensionality which is entirely local (see
Ismael 2012).
Yet, even if the higher dimensionality approach offers a promising alter-
native to action at a distance, it’s not easy to see how the picture would be
adapted to the case of timelike entanglement. The best known higher dimen-
sionality view, wavefunction realism (Albert 1996; Lewis 2004; Ney 2013; Ney
and Albert 2013), posits a fundamental ontology that includes the quantum
wavefunction in a very high-dimensional configuration space. While such view
may have the desired effect of eliminating spatial non-locality, time is left un-
touched.8 The wavefunction evolves in configuration space with time. Thus,
non-local influence among timelike separated regions would remain.
Could it be possible that timelike separated systems are reduced to a single
object in a higher-dimensional space? Certainly. But, there are no known
candidates for such a view. While there is talk of the emergence of space-time
in some theories of quantum gravity, these ideas remain highly speculative.
Furthermore, there is no reason to think that such theories will have the right
features to provide a satisfactory account of entangled systems, much less those
that are timelike separated.
6 Lessons for the metaphysics of entangle-
ment
There are several lessons to be drawn. Most importantly, entanglement swap-
ping doesn’t undermine realism, but rather provides important insight into the
non-separable whole.
8It’s unclear that wavefunction realism is able to account for entanglement in the manner sug-
gested by Ismael. If everything is reduced to the wavefunction in high-dimensional configuration
space, it doesn’t seem able to account for what makes entangled systems special (c.f., Ismael and
Schaffer 2013, 15).
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nature of the entanglement relation. In particular, it compels the realist to
revise certain aspects of their understanding of entanglement:
• Contrary to many presentations of the topic, entanglement does not re-
quire common preparation or previous interaction between entangled sub-
systems.
• Entanglement can account for changes in not just intrinsic (monadic)
properties, but also the relations of entangled subsystems. Indeed, en-
tanglement relations can beget new entanglement relations.
• Delayed-choice entanglement swapping can be accounted for in at least
two ways:
1. Following Egg, the realist can deny that genuine swapping occurs in
delayed-choice setups.
2. The realist can endorse the possibility of timelike entanglement.
By taking the first option, the realist highlights their commitment to
a time-ordering of spacelike events. Taking the latter option requires
modifying the action at a distance or ontological holist views along the
lines explored in the previous section.
I conclude by noting two very different potential sources support for time-
like entanglement: (a) massless quantum fields in the Minkowski vacuum state
(Olson and Ralph 2011, 2012) and (b) temporal analogues of Bell’s theorem
(Brukner et al. 2004; Fritz 2010). The import of these issues for a realist
understanding of timelike entanglement remains to be seen.
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